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Abstract
Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, 
I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of pre-
sentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our 
accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds 
of presentist history, depending on the historians’ purposes and perspectives. My particular 
inclination is pluralist. Science remembers its own history from a particular perspective 
(“whiggism”), which views the past as imperfect versions of the present; if professional 
historians of science shared this perspective, our work would be redundant. Instead, we can 
make it our task to illuminate the aspects of the past of science that scientists themselves 
tend to ignore and forget. History of science can also take a more productive role in the 
creation and improvement of scientific knowledge. Scientific progress as we know it tends 
to involve the shutting down of alternative paths of inquiry, resulting in a loss of potential 
and actual knowledge. A critical and sympathetic engagement with the past allows us to 
recover the lost paths, which can also suggest new paths. These points will be illustrated by 
a number of examples, especially from the history of chemistry and physics, including the 
recovery and extension of past experiments.
Keywords Pluralism · Presentism · Whiggism · Complementary science · Experimental 
replications
1 Introduction
In this paper I seek to synthesize and develop my previously expressed views on three top-
ics: presentism in history-writing, pluralism in science, and the “complementary” role of 
history and philosophy of science with respect to specialist science. The synthetic position 
may be considered a particular type of activist historiography, which holds that by writ-
ing history we should attempt to achieve specific aims pertinent to other aspects of human 
life, going beyond a mere description of the past. In short, my position is that present-
ism is inevitable in history-writing, but that there is a choice to be made in what kind of 
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presentism we opt for; my preference is for a pluralist presentism, which seeks to recover 
and develop aspects of past science that tend to be ignored in scientists’ own views of the 
past. There are many elements going into this synthesis; some of them were developed 
in detail in previous publications, and will only be summarized very briefly; others were 
insufficiently developed before, and will receive more detailed attention here.
2  The Inevitability of Presentism
2.1  Is Anti‑presentism in the Historian’s DNA?
Presentism in historiography is inevitable in a basic sense: the historian is quite simply 
stuck in the present, and it does not make sense to attempt to escape the present (Chang 
2009, 252). This point deserves revisiting and reinforcing, especially since presentism 
remains an anathema to most enlightened historians of science, and perhaps to good histo-
rians in general. In the memorable words of Herbert Butterfield, who gave us the deroga-
tory notion of “Whig history” (1931, 32): “The study of the past with one eye, so to speak, 
upon the present is the source of all sins and sophistries in history, starting with the sim-
plest of them, the anachronism.”1 Michael Gordin, in his review of my book Is Water H2O? 
(Chang 2012a) affirms that Butterfield’s words have become solidified as common sense 
among today’s historians of science: “there is no surer way to dismiss an article, mono-
graph, or talk in the history of science than to expose the Whiggish elements of its analy-
sis.” And he thinks that historians of science are more sensitive to this issue than other 
historians: “In some ways, a militant hostility to Whiggish narratives defines the history of 
science against other fields, and one can often spot historians of science at a talk when they 
query the potentially Whiggish approach of a speaker in, say, military or legal or politi-
cal history.” (Gordin 2014, 417; emphasis original) Gordin considers that “Anti-Whiggism 
seems mandatory today because we have wired it into the central core of our field as a dis-
cipline.” (Gordin 2014, 420, emphasis original)
We have certainly come a long way from 50 years ago, when Thomas Kuhn advocated 
the “new internal historiography of science”, which he characterized as follows: “Insofar as 
possible… the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be 
learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies…. Dealing with innova-
tors, the historian should try to think as they did…. the historian should ask what his sub-
ject thought he had discovered and what he took the basis of that discovery to be.” (Kuhn 
[1968] 1977, 110) Gordin’s summary of the ideal of anti-Whiggism is very much along 
the same lines: “treating the past on its own terms as much as possible, and not simply as a 
runway aimed at the present” (Gordin 2014, 421–422).
2.2  We Cannot Get Away from Ourselves
I want to argue against this disciplinary common sense. Let me begin with a dilemma. 
At the core of historians’ aversion to presentism is the fear of getting the past wrong, the 
worry that writing history “with one eye upon the present” will introduce distortions and 
1 See Wilson and Ashplant (1988, 15) for a succinct view of the problems of presentism, or rather present-
centeredness.
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falsehoods in our view of the past. But the very notion of unqualified objective truth is 
something that anti-Whiggish and anti-presentist historians of science have done so much 
to discredit, so it feels at least uncomfortable for anti-presentism then to invoke plain truth 
in its own defence. But if we come away from the talk of unqualified truth, then in being 
anti-Whiggish, or anti-presentist more generally, we are declaring that a certain type of 
perspective on the past is bad. This requires justification. Butterfield maintained that “real 
historical understanding” was achieved through “attempting to see life with the eyes of 
another century than our own” (1931, 16), but we need to ask if that is really the only way 
or even the best way to achieve historical understanding.
Now, let me come to the sense in which presentism is plainly valid and quite inescap-
able: we historians are inevitably living in the present, no matter how much we might kick 
and scream about it. The historian’s present self cannot be removed from the process or the 
product of history-writing. Our own purposes and perspectives must guide the production 
of our accounts of the past, as they guide the production of anything else that we might say 
and understand. Laurent Loison notes a “resurgence of presentism in the field of history of 
science” in recent years, and goes as far as to say: “The question is therefore no longer if 
we have to make room for presentism, but rather how we should use presentism.” (Loison 
2016, 29; emphases original) And this is not just his own personal view, but a summing-up 
based on a careful and comprehensive digest of recent literature.2
Even though history is about the past, history-writing is for those who are living in the 
present. This is a trivial point, but a clear affirmation of the trivial is a good starting point. 
Let me propose a presentist slogan: “Like funerals, history-writing is for the living.”3 There 
are actually two different points here, which I should distinguish carefully if I am to get 
beyond mere sloganeering. The first point is that it is not plausible to set aside our pre-
sent perspectives completely. Even if you could climb into Aristotle’s head, as Kuhn was 
fond of recommending, how would you know how to navigate inside it? And if you some-
how really succeed in thinking and talking just like Aristotle and his contemporaries, how 
would you come back and tell the rest of us what you have learned?4 If you could truly 
attain this ideal of historiography, you would be Aristotle, and we would need other histo-
rians to decipher for the rest of us what you are saying. The completely faithful history, if 
one could achieve it, might just be the past itself, like Borges’s perfect map that is just the 
terrain itself, and therefore completely useless.
There is an ironic way to put this point. Butterfield targeted anachronism as the “sim-
plest” of all historical sins, but the word has two different definitions: “1. the representation 
of an event, person, or thing in a historical context in which it could not have occurred or 
existed; 2. a person or thing that belongs or seems to belong to another time.”5 So, if we 
truly succeeded in avoiding anachronism (def. 1), then we would become an anachronism 
(def. 2). Anachronism can be both the imposition of the present onto the past, and the 
unwanted intrusion of the unfiltered and incomprehensible past into the present! There are 
insurmountable problems with the idea that the historian should simply give a complete 
and accurate description of the past and reach a faithful understanding of the past. I do not 
2 I do not cite here all the works discussed in Loison’s excellent article, but merely refer the reader to his 
bibliography and his succinct presentation of various key sources.
3 The saying about funerals being for the living is attributed to Roelif Coe Brinkerhoff.
4 Loison (2016, 31) takes the need to communicate in the present as the basis for what he calls “descriptive 
presentism”.
5 Collins English Dictionary, 4th ed. (1998).
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at all mean to deny that the past is “a foreign country” where “they do things differently”. 
But when we travel to that foreign country we remain to a significant extent who we are, 
and “going native” can only be partial if we hope to tell anyone else what we learn by 
doing so.
Now, there is an obvious rejoinder to this, from the opponents of presentism: we histo-
rians cannot get completely away from the present, but we should try. Here is Gordin again 
(2014, 421): “The most important quality of Tory [anti-Whig] history is that it is hard, even 
unnaturally hard.” Agreed—but how do we deal with that difficulty? This brings me to the 
second sense in which history-writing is for the living. Given that it is impossible to rid 
ourselves of the present completely, there are choices to be made, regarding how much and 
which specific parts of our present selves we should try to set aside, and which other parts 
we should accept as the platform for our narrative and analysis. These choices should be 
made according to the purposes of the various people who produce and utilize accounts of 
the past. So we come to the big question of historiography: why do we do history?—which 
is also to say—why do we do history? It is absurd to imagine that we can have a full sense 
of what is good and bad history, if we have not carefully articulated the purposes of doing 
history. Sadly, I have often observed colleagues and students passing such judgements in 
the absence of articulated purposes.
In contrast, Butterfield himself emphasized that the description of any historical situa-
tion was inevitably a matter of “abridgement” (Butterfield 1931, 24, etc.). The process of 
abridgement is unavoidably guided by our conceptual frameworks and our interests. When 
we move beyond mere description and think about the explanatory tasks of the historian, it 
is even more apparent that we cannot take the historian out of the history. What counts as a 
satisfactory explanation is surely dependent on our broader assumptions and aspirations.6 
In addition, just as we historians do not want to let scientists believe that their selection of 
problems to study is completely disinterested, we should not let ourselves believe that our 
selection of historical questions is not affected by our present concerns. Accepting these 
aspects of subjectivity or “perspectivality” in the work of the historian means accepting 
present-centeredness.
All this, on reflection, is hopefully a matter of common sense for anyone who has actu-
ally done historical research and writing. But why might it come across as controversial? 
As Nick Jardine once said (2003, 134): “All too often recent historians of science have 
abandoned common sense in their flight from presentism.” Jardine himself has a more 
relaxed view about presentism, and considers that the interpretation of the past in terms of 
the present is indispensable to the work of the historian (Jardine 2003, 128).
2.3  Activist Presentism
The sense of presentism just discussed indicates that the inevitability of presentism is not 
the end of the story. We can also think more positively about how to embrace the inevitable 
presence of the present, using it selectively and wisely in order to do better history to meet 
our historiographical purposes. That is the activist meaning that I would like to give to the 
word “presentism”: it is an “ism” in the sense of an ideology, a commitment to investigate 
history based on a clear and conscious engagement with our present, ultimately in order to 
6 This is on full display in a recent “Focus” section of the journal Isis, which was a collection of exemplary 
explanatory accounts provided by leading historians of science (Cohen, ed., 2019).
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improve that present. I have quoted Paul Forman more than once in this connection (Chang 
2009, 254; 2017, 104), but it is worth highlighting again his inspiring exhortation for his-
torians of science to embrace “the obligation to decide for ourselves what is the good of 
science, and by our historical research and writing to advance that good.” (Forman 1991, 
86) At the centre of Forman’s vision is the historian as a free and active agent, firmly and 
consciously rooted in her or his own present. A judicious and active presentism can be an 
effective aid to historiography.
One particular issue that deserves close attention is the often-repeated anti-presentist 
advice that we should always seek to use actors’ categories in our historical descriptions 
and analyses. For the purpose of reaching the most informative and meaningful descrip-
tion or explanation, there is actually no guarantee, not even a very high likelihood, that 
actors’ categories provide the best framework for it.7 The very designation of our business 
as the “history of science” constitutes a general admission of this point, if we include the 
pre-modern branches of learning (in Europe and even the rest of the world) as part of our 
subject matter. And I think there is indeed a case for including at least certain aspects of 
alchemy and astrology, for example, in the history of science. Many would bristle at calling 
a 16th-century alchemist a “scientist”, but before we give a purist reaction we should think 
carefully about exactly what harm such a designation does. I think it actually does more 
good than harm to regard an alchemist as a scientist, at least as a refreshing alternative to 
the more usual conception of an alchemist as a mystic or an occultist. Of course, the benefit 
or harm of such designations depends on the context in which we are working. But that is 
exactly the nature of the kind of presentism that I am advocating: what counts as a cogent 
and informative historical description depends on the historian’s own present context.
When it comes to explaining the past, the possible benefits of departing from the actors’ 
own conceptions are even more evident.8 For example, a Marxist analysis of the political 
and cultural practices of a society in terms of the modes of economic production can be 
very informative and illuminating even if the “mode of production” would have been an 
entirely alien concept to the people of that society themselves. And even if the actors did 
possess the conceptual categories in terms of which we historians are trying to understand 
their actions, it may well be the case that they would have sincerely denied the cogency of 
the explanations offered by us. One does not have to look very far to find people that we 
think were clearly motivated by racist, sexist, imperialist and other motivations, to whom 
such explanations would have come as a genuine surprise. Similarly, when Mario Biagioli 
(1993) says that Galileo’s actions make the best sense when we understand them as calcu-
lated to attain maximal patronage from the Medici court, or when Steven Shapin (1975) 
says that the advocates of phrenology in early 19th-century Edinburgh were motivated by 
social interests, or when Paul Forman (1971) says that physicists and mathematicians were 
prematurely pushed into renouncing causality in physics by capitulating to the cultural 
pressures of the Weimar era, we can accept those historical explanations as cogent and 
insightful, regardless of whether the actors themselves would have seen such explanations 
as correct or even coherent. Understanding what the actors themselves thought is valuable, 
but it is not necessarily the best way of understanding why they thought or did what they 
did.
7 For a similar conclusion see Arabatzis (2019, 357–358), in his masterful summing-up commentary on the 
Focus section of the Isis issue mentioned in the previous note.
8 This is related to what Loison (2016, 31–32) calls “causal–narrative presentism”.
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What matters ultimately is not whether to restore supremacy to the past actors’ own 
description of themselves and their own times, but how to manage different parties in the 
present with different interests and opinions fighting it out for the right to offer their views 
of the past. That is a very important point for the practice of revisionism, a staple in the 
work of thoughtful historians. Revisionism is, by definition, an activity shaped by the pre-
sent, namely the present state of historiography. It would be very difficult to argue that 
what counts as a cogent and useful revision is independent of our own positions. In revi-
sionist history we can certainly do a better job by being more aware of our present selves. 
But it is also a general theme in any historiography: a more conscious presentism should 
beneficially enhance our awareness of the present factors that inevitably enter our historical 
work.
3  Different Kinds of Presentism
Having argued for presentist historiography in general terms, I now want to distinguish 
different kinds of presentism and consider their merits and demerits, before I articulate 
in the next section the particular kind of presentism that I advocate. There are many pos-
sible varieties of presentism. Loison (2016) helpfully distinguishes four different common 
forms of it, plus one other that he himself advocates, building on Georges Canguilhem’s 
historical epistemology. Although I have not framed my whole analysis in terms of Loi-
son’s typology, in the course of my discussion I refer to various types distinguished by 
him whenever it is illuminating to do so. From my own perspective, I want to highlight 
three manifestations of presentism for consideration here, because they tend not to receive 
proper attention in the literature.
3.1  Whiggism
The first is whiggism.9 Presentism is not synonymous with whiggism, despite the frequent 
conflation of the two. Whiggism is only one particular variety of presentism, based on a 
strong optimistic assumption of progress that conceives present science to be unequivo-
cally better than past science. Even though it is a widespread assumption among those who 
think seriously about science, it is not shared by all presentists. It is a real possibility, for 
example, to regard the history of science as a succession of different ways of understanding 
nature, none clearly better than the rest (consider Paul Feyerabend’s views, for example).
I do not expect readers of this paper to be surprised to hear that there are problems with 
whiggism. Rather than rehearsing the well-known problems, I want to put forward a com-
plementary point: even whiggism has its uses. Let us consider whether there are any merits 
to whiggism, or rather, any circumstances under which whiggism serves a useful function. 
The prevalence of whiggish history of science cannot be explained simply as a result of 
people’s ignorance or crudeness; rather, whiggism is so prevalent because it does serve 
some useful functions. Whiggish history motivates aspiring science students, and reminds 
9 From this point on in the paper I will use the words “whiggism” and “whiggish” without capitalizing it, 
to indicate that it is a general historiographical position that is meant, rather than a specific reference to the 
Whig Party in English (or American) history.
Presentist History for Pluralist Science 
1 3
the public of the virtues of science. These are significant and noble purposes, though they 
should not be pursued dogmatically and in a way that encourages false consciousness.
Whiggism can also serve a surprising revisionist function. This is when it meets some-
thing even more crude, namely what I have called “triumphalism” (Chang 2009, Sect. 4), 
which takes the side of whoever was the winner in an argument or a struggle. A very sim-
ple and simple-minded example will illustrate this point. In the city of Leeds in northern 
England there is a small church called Mill Hill Chapel, which proudly displays a com-
memorative blue plaque outside: “Joseph Priestley, LL.D., F.R.S., discoverer of oxygen, 
was minister here 1767–1773.” This declaration might make both Priestley and Lavoisier 
turn in their graves. Lavoisier: no, I discovered oxygen! Priestley: I discovered no such 
thing—I discovered dephlogisticated air! The impulse on the part of those who say that 
Priestley discovered oxygen is quite clearly whiggish. They dispense with Priestley’s own 
categories, in order to fit him into the progressive march of science: he made that gas which 
was later recognized as oxygen, and did so before Lavoisier, so let us not be fussy about it 
and just call Priestley the discoverer of oxygen. In normal circumstances such a simplifica-
tion would be a somewhat pointless distortion of history, but in this case it serves as a use-
ful corrective to the tendency to give all the credit to the victorious Lavoisier.
Therefore, to call Priestley the discoverer of oxygen can be a very useful and instructive 
thing because it makes people think differently. And it is more effective in this regard than 
emphasizing that Priestley discovered dephlogisticated air, to which the typical uninformed 
response would be “So what?” Although there are some situations in which it is better not 
to translate “dephlogisticated air” into “oxygen”, that is not universally the case. I came 
across Priestley’s blue plaque in the midst of my research challenging the still surprisingly 
widespread narrative that Lavoisier was the “father of modern chemistry” and that the dis-
covery of oxygen was the centrepiece of his Chemical Revolution. In this context it was 
very useful to have a reminder that it was Priestley the recalcitrant phlogistonist who actu-
ally discovered oxygen and told Lavoisier about it in the first place.10 That never fails to 
make the naïve scientific or public audiences to sit up and pay attention.
3.2  Philosophical History
The second mode of presentism that I want to highlight is a common and conscious use of 
the history of science by philosophers of science. This is the business of trying to charac-
terize the nature of scientific knowledge and its development, using historical facts as evi-
dence for or against various philosophical views. What is presentist about history done for 
such a purpose is, of course, the fact that most philosophers are using current philosophical 
conceptions, rather than those belonging to the settings in which the past scientists in ques-
tion operated. And this should be separated from the incidental fact that most philosophers 
also happen to be whiggish about the history of science; it is by no means necessary for 
philosophy to be whiggish, as it is not a requirement that philosophers should subscribe to 
progressivism.
Historians of science observing the typical philosophers’ use of history often get quite 
irritated: on the one hand, they do like attention being paid to history, and empirically 
10 And Carl Wilhelm Scheele, another phlogistonist, actually made oxygen even before Priestley, though 
the publication of his work was unfortunately delayed. Recognizing the plurality of answers is more useful 
than going into a blind realism (but who, really, discovered oxygen?), or nihilism (“discovery” means noth-
ing).
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grounded arguments are preferable to pure armchair philosophy; on the other hand, philos-
ophers engaged in this exercise often seem to misuse history. There has been a clear aller-
gic reaction against the “historical philosophy of science”, and this has constituted a seri-
ous obstacle in the way of establishing history-and-philosophy of science as an integrated 
discipline.11 One emblematic moment in this debate was the opposition between Thomas 
Kuhn and Imre Lakatos, who clashed at the Philosophy of Science Association conference 
in 1970. Objecting especially to Lakatos’s notion of “rational reconstruction of history”,12 
Kuhn retorted (1971, 143): “What Lakatos conceives as history is not history at all but phi-
losophy fabricating examples…. Why is it… that Lakatos feels the need to protect himself 
from real history?” He continued his attack a decade later (Kuhn 1980, 182–183): Lakato-
sian historians “aim to show that much scientific behavior, previously seen as anomalous 
or irrational, demanding of external historical explanation, appears appropriate and rational 
when viewed in terms of Lakatos’s method of research programmes. As a motive for doing 
history that one seems to me a likely invitation to disaster.”13
The historians’ wariness here is understandable. However, it is a mistake to think that 
philosophical framing of history, in comparison to other types of framing, has a particu-
larly distorting effect on the facts. Rather, what is often problematic is a particular man-
ner of philosophical framing that is based on a simplistic view of the philosophy–history 
relation as a version of the naively conceived theory–evidence relation. It may work to 
consider the philosophy of science as “the science of science”, but not if it is modelled on 
an outdated view of how empirical science works. Lakatos (1971) was very well aware of 
the pitfalls here, and gave a lengthy discussion of how the philosophy of science provides 
meta-level research programmes in the historiography of science.
The legitimacy of present philosophical concepts as framing devices for historiography, 
in general, requires no justification over and above the general justification for presentism 
in Section 2. Whatever concern that is important to us in the present should be allowed a 
role as a framing device for historiography, and philosophical concerns are no exception. 
Almost any conceptual framework can serve as a vehicle for historical investigation, and 
ultimately its usefulness can only be judged by its fruits. It is a legitimate way of doing his-
tory, to ask whether and how actual scientific developments fit with certain philosophical 
views about how science works, whether they be realism, reductionism, Bayesian eviden-
tial reasoning, or whatever. We can ask whether and how scientific practices have embod-
ied certain values, such as simplicity, scope, or explanatory power. We can also ask about 
the ethical stances and struggles of past scientists. Or we can trace in scientific practices 
certain metaphysical doctrines concerning causation, identity, space and time, or whatnot. 
These philosophical questions concerning science are just as valid and interesting as socio-
logical, political, cultural, economic, or other kinds of questions. Their value and cogency 
depend on the contexts and the conduct of investigation. There should not be a blanket pro-
hibition of the philosophical framing of historical questions.
11 For a detailed discussion of this tension, see Chang (2012b) and references therein, including Kuhn’s 
1968 paper on “the trouble with the historical philosophy of science”.
12 Witness the infamous suggestion from Lakatos (1971, 107; emphases original): "One way to indicate 
discrepancies between history and its rational reconstruction is to relate the internal history in the text, and 
indicate in the footnotes how actual history ’misbehaved’ in the light of its rational reconstruction."
13 Conscious of his own notorious view that facts are not neutral arbiters of theory, Kuhn added: “The his-
torian’s problem is not simply that the facts do not speak for themselves but that, unlike the scientist’s data, 
they speak exceedingly softly. Quiet is required if they are to be heard at all.”
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The defence of philosophical history can be made stronger and sharper, too. If history 
of science should concern itself chiefly with the development of scientific knowledge, then 
we might argue that epistemology is the most proper framework for the historiography of 
science, after all. And if we should take a broader view of what philosophy means, we 
can endorse Ernest Gellner’s view on the necessity of philosophical history (1988, 11–12): 
“We inevitably assume a pattern of human history. There is simply no choice concerning 
whether we use such a pattern. We are, all of us, philosophical historians malgré nous, 
whether we wish it or not. The only choice we have is whether we make our vision as 
explicit, coherent and compatible with available facts as we can, or whether we employ it 
more or less unconsciously and incoherently…. Those who spurn philosophical history are 
slaves of defunct thinkers and unexamined theories.”
3.3  Emancipatory Presentism
The mode of presentist history I next want to examine engages with the past in quite a dif-
ferent way. In what I will call “emancipatory” historiography, the historian uses the under-
standing of the past to liberate us from its legacy. If we recognize that contingent decisions 
made in the past shape our present, we can see that what may seem inevitable to us actu-
ally was, and can again be, a matter of human choice. This rather psychoanalytic insight is 
perhaps not a mainstream view in historiography, but it has a very respectable pedigree, 
including Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Benedetto Croce. It was 
Croce (1941, 48) who gave us the famous dictum: “Only historical judgement liberates the 
spirit from the pressure of the past.”
This insight is perhaps most obviously applicable in political history, but I believe that 
our scientific life, too, can benefit from seeing the apparent necessities of today as conse-
quences of past contingencies. Where I first came across Croce’s dictum was in the physi-
cist John Archibald Wheeler’s preface to the summary volume for the Archive for the His-
tory of Quantum Physics (Kuhn et al. 1967, v). Wheeler did not elaborate on what kind of 
liberation concerning quantum physics one could seek from understanding its history, but 
I think that a key issue informing his thinking must have been the historical contingency 
involved in the establishment of the Copenhagen Interpretation. Wheeler is known for his 
advocacy of the unorthodox “many-worlds interpretation” of quantum mechanics, which 
was his particular gloss on the work of Hugh Everett. This counter-orthodox historiograph-
ical vision concerning quantum physics is expressed more clearly and explicitly in works 
by James Cushing (1994) and John Heilbron (1985).14
I have enormous appreciation for emancipatory historiography. A large part of my 
own research has been carried out in its spirit, exposing the historical contingency of 
many items of scientific common sense, ranging from the belief that water is  H2O (Chang 
2012a) to the necessary truth of the standard interpretation of the special theory of rel-
ativity (Chang 1993). However, I think there is a limitation to emancipatory presentism 
in that it is only reactive, responding to specific undesirable legacies of the past. This is 
similar to how the news cycle easily gets dominated by unsavory persons and happenings, 
rather than more positive matters. It is possible for presentist history to claim a broader and 
14 There are similar examples concerning other areas of physics, including Andrew Pickering’s (1984) 
work showing contingency in the establishment of quantum chromodynamics.
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independent remit, starting from the most important of our present concerns and seeking 
out the historical roots of the pertinent elements of our present situation.
4  Pluralist Presentism
4.1  Pluralism, Anti‑whiggism and the Point of Professional History
I hope I have said enough by now to demonstrate that a basic level of presentism is una-
voidable in our work as historians, and that adopting various types of presentism con-
sciously and deliberately can enhance the value of our historical work. Now I would like 
to articulate my own particular view on how best to shape and direct presentist historiog-
raphy. Of the many purposes that we can achieve by doing history, which do I particularly 
aim for, and how? I advocate a historiographical pluralism, which works in close relation 
to pluralism concerning science itself. I believe that the most urgent task of history-writing 
is to offer perspectives on the past that are missing in mainstream views. This is still pre-
sentism, but of a rebellious kind. It stems from the recognition that the present is not one 
monolithic entity, even in science. There are various actors and various perspectives and 
various interests in our present social and scientific world. Historiographical pluralism is a 
commitment to recognize this plurality, and to resist the exclusive commandeering of the 
past by the dominant forces of today. Such pluralism is in fact a very familiar and accepted 
historiographical trend in our postmodern world of identity politics. But does it have any 
validity concerning the history of science? My answer is yes.
My view is based on a pluralism concerning scientific knowledge itself, which I have 
argued for elsewhere (especially Chang 2012a, ch. 5). I will not repeat those arguments 
here; instead I want to discuss what good historiography of science should look like, if we 
accept pluralism about science—which is also to say, how pluralism about science leads to 
pluralism in the history of science. Before I go on, I should briefly state what I conceive 
pluralism concerning science to be: it is a commitment to maintain and develop multiple 
systems of practice even within a given field of study. The need for such pluralism con-
cerning science arises from the fact that modern science has developed largely in a monist 
spirit—looking for the one scientific truth about the one reality that we all inhabit, assum-
ing that there is one right answer to each scientific question, and one best method for arriv-
ing at that right answer.
This monistic, even dogmatic, nature of modern science has a clear effect on scientists’ 
perspectives on the past. History of science written by monist scientists tends to downplay 
the plurality that has existed in science, reinforcing the impression that successful science 
always requires uniformity and consensus. Given this situation, it makes sense for profes-
sional historians of science to become pluralists, to illuminate the parts of the past of sci-
ence that scientists themselves ignore. Pluralist historians turn away from the celebration of 
the winners, and even from the usual search for consensus-points. We seek to counter the 
retrospective tidying-up tendency of other historians and most scientists, freely exhibiting 
long-running disputes and unresolved questions and celebrating the rugged individualists 
and quirky sub-communities.
Such pluralism gives us a useful perspective from which to re-examine whiggism, which 
now seems more clearly a redundant and futile sort of historiography, if practiced by profes-
sional historians. The real problem with whiggish history of science is that it always aligns its 
value-judgements with the current orthodoxy. This is a problem especially if you happen to 
Presentist History for Pluralist Science 
1 3
consider the current orthodoxy as wrong or unjust,15 but even if that is not the case there are 
good grounds for not signing up to whiggism. As Kuhn stressed, normal scientists actively 
select and reshape history so as to make their own paradigm appear to be the natural culmina-
tion of progressive developments. If historians of science would then jump in and produce 
more of that kind of history, there is a sense of futility to that enterprise. Why should we pro-
fessional historians duplicate what scientists can and will do themselves (even if they tend to 
do it only after retirement)? We have all seen this sort of history, sometimes distilled into little 
boxes in science textbooks, and we rightly reject it as a model for professional history of sci-
ence. But the reason for rejection is not that such history is wrong (it often is not so wrong), 
but that it is unoriginal and uninteresting. The dominant forces in society already remember 
history so as to suit themselves; we do not need professional historians to add to that work.
For the benefit of the wider society, I think it is far more interesting and useful if we 
professional historians give attention to the valuable bits of past science that modern sci-
entists consider unimportant, outdated, or simply wrong. Much more stimulating accounts 
can be produced on the basis of a pluralist presumption: the current dominant system in a 
field of science is not the only good approach to the understanding of nature, and looking 
at the past is one of the possible ways of finding other good ones. What I like to practice 
is “loser’s history”, whose aim is to dig up from the past something good that has become 
neglected, and to bring it to the present.
But we cannot possibly pay attention to all the losers from the past! There are far too many, 
and many of them were real “losers” (in the American colloquial sense of the word) who do 
not deserve much attention. Now, that is a presentist judgement. When I say that some bits of 
past science are valuable enough to write about and others are not, I am making a judgement 
very much rooted in my present. And what is operative here is my present, not the present of 
the orthodox professional scientists. So Gordin (2014, 422) is not quite correct when he says 
that my kind of work is ultimately whiggish because my scientific judgements can only be 
made on the basis of present-day science. True, I cannot reject the entirety of modern science 
and still function in a sensible way intellectually in today’s world (and nor can he), but I can go 
really quite far in hacking away a large part of the platform on which I stand.
So, while not pretending to get away from the inevitable level of presentism, we should 
indeed try to get away from whiggism, in most circumstances. In Section 3.1 I have indi-
cated that even whiggism can serve the purpose of pluralism, but that is only in peculiar 
situations. Historians of science should make it at least part of our business to present 
accounts of past science that go against the grain of the dominant assumptions and analyti-
cal frameworks possessed by current scientists. As the saying goes, science is too impor-
tant to be left entirely to the scientists. But I must stress that I have no anti-science agenda. 
Rather, the point is to save science from some of its own excesses. Gordin (2014, 421) is 
correct to call me an “anti–anti-Whig” in some of my methodological discourse.16 How-
ever, most of my historical practice is actually consciously anti-whiggish, yet presentist.
15 In that case anti-whiggish presentist historiography becomes a tool of resistance, as with emancipatory 
history. As Butterfield (1951, 171–172) once said in relation to the misuse of history by political powers: 
“We must teach history… precisely because so much bad history exists in the world already…. and even 
those who do not pretend to know any history… are the slaves of unconscious assumptions or concealed 
perversities on the subject of the past.”
16 He draws a parallel to the way in which many sensible people during the McCarthy era were “anti-anti-
communist” while their sympathies were clearly not communist.
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4.2  Complementary Science
The pluralist historiography that I advocate here is closely related to my vision of the his-
tory and philosophy of science as “complementary science” (Chang 2004, ch. 6). The basic 
idea of complementary science is that we can do history and philosophy of science with 
the aim of improving scientific knowledge in ways that are not taken up by scientists them-
selves. In the context of this paper, it is important to note that what I am talking about is 
the improvement of present scientific knowledge, so we are squarely in the realm of pre-
sentist historiography. Given the current monistic and hegemonic tendencies in science, 
scientific progress tends to be accompanied by the shutting down of alternative paths of 
inquiry and a resulting loss of potential and actual knowledge. A critical and sympathetic 
engagement with the past of science allows us to recover the lost paths, which can also sug-
gest new paths. In that way, methods and resources of history and philosophy of science 
can be employed in order to locate and address scientific questions productively. Comple-
mentary science seeks to generate scientific knowledge in places where science itself fails 
to do so.
This is not to deny that science is very good at what it does, but just to note that there are 
things that science does not currently do, even though they are quite scientific. The more 
well-defined and focused specialist science becomes, the more exclusive and exclusionary 
it tends to turn. This is another lasting insight from Kuhn’s (1962) reflections on the nature 
of paradigm-based “normal science”. A need for complementary science arises from the 
fact that specialist science cannot afford to be completely open.17 There are two chief 
aspects to this lack of openness. First, in specialist science many elements of knowledge 
must be taken for granted, since they are used as foundations or tools for studying other 
things. Then, certain other ideas and questions must be suppressed if they contradict or 
destabilize the taken-for-granted items of knowledge—not maliciously or gratuitously, but 
out of necessity. Second, not all worthwhile questions can be addressed, if only due to the 
limitation of resources. Each specialist scientific community will have some degree of con-
sensus within itself about which problems are most urgent, and which problems can most 
plausibly be solved. Those problems that are considered either unimportant or unsolvable 
will be neglected. These are reasonable acts of prioritization. All the same, we must face 
up to the fact that suppressed and neglected questions do represent a loss of knowledge, 
actual and potential. What complementary science primarily aims at is not “the science of 
science”, nor the understanding of past scientists. Complementary science, working along-
side specialist science, aspires to enhance our knowledge and understanding of nature.
There are three main ways in which complementary science can generate and improve 
scientific knowledge. It can address critical questions concerning present science, recover 
useful ideas and facts from past science, and explore alternative conceptual systems and 
lines of experimental inquiry for future science. These ideas are explained in detail else-
where,18 but I would like to revisit them here, giving very brief summaries and adding 
explanations of the connection to pluralist historiography.
17 Here and elsewhere I speak of "specialist science" rather than "normal science", so as not to distract 
those who reject Kuhn’s particular ideas about normal science or paradigms.
18 See Chang (2004, 240–247). There is also a more brief discussion in Chang (2017), with some examples 
that I did not have available at the time of the earlier work.
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4.3  Critical Awareness
There is a sense in which we do not truly know anything unless we know how we know 
it. With a critical awareness of uncertainty and inconclusiveness, our knowledge reaches 
a higher level of flexibility and sophistication. For example, there is little that deserves the 
name of knowledge in being able to recite that the earth revolves around the sun. More 
intellectual value comes with the understanding of the evidence and arguments that con-
vinced Copernicus and his followers to reject the firmly established, highly developed and 
eminently sensible system of geocentric astronomy established by Ptolemy. This is exactly 
the kind of scientific knowledge that is not easily available in current specialist science 
(who really knows about Ptolemaic astronomy any more?) but can be given by comple-
mentary science.
Now, critique may be considered the proper province of philosophy rather than history, 
but history really is one of the most effective tools for generating critical awareness. As 
Loison (2016, 36) puts it: “by reactivating the complexity of the past, one develops the 
tools to criticize present science.” This plays out most importantly in relation to the con-
tingency of scientific knowledge.19 If we know that there are credible alternatives to our 
current way of thinking, the latter will lose its appearance of invincibility and necessary 
truth. But first we have to be exposed to the possibility of alternatives, and history can help 
us here. Especially in the usual state of indoctrination in low-level modern science that is 
imposed on most educated people in today’s Western and Western-oriented societies, our 
imagination is severely hampered and we are incapable of thinking in very different ways 
even if we try. As the right kind of foreign travel can expose and challenge our unrecog-
nized cultural assumptions, our minds can be opened up by a liberal study of past science.
In my career as a historian of science, I have delighted in numerous knee-slapping 
moments when, reading some past scientific book or paper, I could not help exclaiming: 
“So, you could think like that!” It is impossible to give an exhaustive list, but just for a 
flavour: Celsius’s original thermometer with an “upside-down” scale, 0 at boiling and 100 
at freezing; Rumford’s hypothesis of “frigorific rays” to explain the curious experiments 
in which a distant cold object cooled down a hot object instantly; Carnot’s original under-
standing of heat engines as the production of work by caloric falling from a place of high 
temperature to low, in a waterfall analogy; Le Sage’s explanation of gravity by reference 
to the pressure exerted by all-pervasive “ultramundane” particles bombarding everything 
from all directions; the surprisingly cogent phlogistonist explanation of what we now call 
redox reactions.20 These moments of recognizing new cogent conceptual possibilities from 
the past generate a profound sense of critical awareness.
Pluralist historiography can also give us critical awareness in a somewhat different way. 
Even if we are simply tracing the origins of today’s orthodoxy, history can often reveal the 
contingency of the past decisions. In this sense, reading Kuhn on The Copernican Revolu-
tion (1957) is better philosophical education than reading The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions (1962). How amazing it is to see that Copernicus did not have knock-down factual 
arguments against Ptolemy at the time! The recognition of contingency can lead to a sense 
of liberty and choice. This function of history in enhancing critical awareness is closely 
related to emancipatory presentism discussed in Section 3.3.
19 For an up-to-date and broad-ranging discussion of the contingency question, see Soler et al. (2015).
20 I have written in detail about most of these episodes in Chang (2002), Chang (2004), and Chang (2012a).
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4.4  Recovery
In the line of work that I call “recovery” under the scheme of complementary science, the 
historian adds to scientific knowledge by dredging up forgotten facts and ideas from past 
science. Again, the main aim here is presentist: reviving past knowledge to let it live in the 
present. Even the old-fashioned historian’s connoisseurship of the past is really an act of 
recovery, into which we can inject a more active and conscious presentism.21 Now, it is 
important to recognize that those who appreciate recovery must subscribe to pluralism at 
least to a degree, to believe that there can be something worth recovering in the parts of the 
past that we have discarded. Such pluralism is usually not extended to the realm of science, 
where the common sense is that what scientists have discarded must be either wrong or 
useless.
Ultimately, the possibility of useful recovery can only be demonstrated by its actuality. 
This is more easily done with experiments than theory. For example, in my work on the 
history of temperature, I came across many puzzling experimental reports of anomalous 
boiling temperature and behavior of water even under standard conditions (Chang 2004, 
ch. 1). I was able to confirm most of these observations with my own simple experiments 
(Chang 2007; 2011, Sect. 3). Since that experience I have been engaged in a steady line 
of laboratory work recovering a number of lost phenomena, especially in the area of elec-
trochemistry (for early reports, see Chang 2011, Sects. 4, 5 and Chang 2017). My experi-
ments are “physical” rather than “historical” replications (Chang 2011, 320). That is to say, 
my primary aim in these experiments is to recover the phenomena in question, rather than 
to recreate the exact conditions of the past experiments or the personal experiences of the 
past experimenters. It is fine to use modern apparatus and materials; in fact, the less similar 
the specific circumstances, the better for showing the robustness of the phenomena.22 This 
is presentism again: in this line of work my learning about the past of science adds to our 
present knowledge of nature.
Recovery is not restricted to facts, but extends to ideas as well. Come to think of it, 
historians of science have always made efforts to recover all sorts of ideas that modern 
science has forgotten. There is no point in picking out a few examples out of the great mul-
titude, but the works of William Newman and Lawrence Principe on the history of alchemy 
deserve a special mention, as they have forged a rare and exemplary path of conceptual-
and-factual recovery in an area of science that is normally not even considered scientific.23 
In my own work there are also many examples, often linked to the cases cited above in 
which historical learning has led to critical awareness.
4.5  Extension
Recovery and critical awareness are valuable in themselves, but they can also stimulate 
the production of genuinely novel knowledge. The work of extension is strictly speaking 
21 Beautiful expressions of this point were given by Henri-Irénée Marrou and Barthold Niebuhr, quoted in 
Chang (2017, 100).
22 What is involved here is an indirect demonstration (rather than an assumption) of the constancy of 
nature, which underlies what Loison (2016, 30–31) calls “empirical presentism”.
23 Their contributions have been published in a number of different places, but Fors et al. (2016) gives a 
good sense of this line of work, with Principe’s main publications listed in footnote 6 on p. 87. A good indi-
cation of Newman’s work can be seen in his online resource on Newton’s alchemy (Newman 2019).
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not historical, but it is a direct consequence and benefit of doing history in the presentist 
and pluralist way I have been advocating here. Again, it will strike many readers as highly 
implausible that genuinely novel scientific knowledge can stem from historical work, and 
ultimately the only way to demonstrate the possibility is to show actual successes.
For example, it was through his study of the history of mechanics that Ernst Mach recog-
nized Newton’s absolute space and time to be unnecessary. This recognition then prompted 
Mach to advocate a relational theory of space, which in turn helped pave Einstein’s path to 
relativity (see Norton 2010). Mach’s “historical–critical method” was intended to lead to 
new and better science through a critical examination of the past. In our own day, Martin 
Rudwick took methodological ideas from Cuvier to help him in “reconstructing the mode 
of life of extinct invertebrates, of brachiopods”, which was successful despite “hostility and 
opposition from paleontologists who could not think that anything good could come from 
someone pre-Darwin, especially an anti-evolutionist whom [he] was using for evolutionary 
purposes.”24 Such productive engagements with the past of science cannot be undertaken 
without a pluralist allowance that the dominant science of one’s own day is not the only 
possible way of understanding nature. Loison (2016, 36) stresses this as a requirement for 
his “critical presentism”: in Canguilhem’s idiom, “the truth of the day” is not “the truth of 
always”.
As with recovery, it is easier in the realm of experimental work to convince skeptical 
observers of the plausibility of extension. When a forgotten experiment is re-discovered 
and replicated, follow-up questions arise very naturally. Theoretically, how do we explain 
the recovered phenomena? For example, when I recovered Charles Sylvester’s experiment 
of growing a beautiful silver tree by simply inserting a copper wire into a solution of silver 
nitrate (Chang 2017, 99–101), questions immediately arose as to the cogency of Sylvester’s 
200-year-old explanation. And if we reject Sylvester’s own explanation, what would be a 
better one?25 Experimentally, once any interesting experiment has been made, plans for 
further experiments are likely to arise immediately: “but what happens if I do this?” And 
new experiments are quite likely to reveal new facts. For example, in the course of doing 
some follow-up experiments reproducing basic early 19th-century voltaic cells, I was led to 
discover that the electrolysis of a solution of common salt (NaCl) results in the solution of 
gold wire that is used as the positive-side electrode (anode), when the applied voltage is in 
a window of roughly 2 to 3.5 volts (Chang 2017, 103).
Historians have generally refrained from further developing the knowledge that they 
uncover from past science, but I see no compelling reasons for this. An emblematic exam-
ple here is Kuhn. Having made such strenuous and persuasive arguments that certain dis-
carded systems of knowledge (e.g. Aristotelian physics, Ptolemaic astronomy, or the phlo-
giston theory) were coherent and not simply incorrect, Kuhn gave no indication that these 
theories deserved to be developed further from where they were at the time of their extinc-
tion. Why not? According to his criterion of judgement, scientific revolutions constitute 
progress when the newer paradigm acquires a greater problem-solving ability than ever 
achieved by the older paradigm. But how do we know that the demonstrated superiority of 
the new paradigm is not merely a result of the fact that scientists abandoned the older para-
digm and gave up the effort to improve its problem-solving ability?
25 I have not yet managed to get many current specialists in electrochemistry to take up these questions 
seriously, but that is not to say such questions cannot form useful research topics for current specialists.
24 See Meyer (2008) for this quotation and a brief introductory discussion.
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A similar question also arises at the conclusion of some other historians’ works on sci-
entific controversy. For example, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985) strongly chal-
lenged the received wisdom that Hobbes’s ideas about pneumatics were rightly rejected in 
favor of Boyle’s superior views. But they did not suggest that it would be worthwhile to 
try developing Hobbes’s ideas further. Ordinary historians, of course, have an easy answer 
here: it is not their job to develop scientific ideas actively. But whose job is it? It is per-
fectly understandable that scientists would not want to be drawn into research programmes 
rejected long ago. This is where complementary science enters. Lacking an obligation to 
conform to the current orthodoxy, the complementary scientist is free to invest some time 
and energy in developing unorthodox systems.
5  Concluding Remarks
The purpose of historiography is usually seen as the description and explanation of the 
past. What I have proposed in this paper is that history-writing can and should serve the 
purpose of improving the present as well. This suggestion may not be so controversial 
in general, but it is usually met with incredulity and suspicion when it is carried into the 
realm of science. This is because of the strong monist intuitions people have about science. 
When combined with the kind of progressivism that is at the basis of whiggism, this mon-
ism confers an aura of inevitability to our current scientific knowledge.
Pluralist historiography can help break down this illusion, and thereby actively aid sci-
entific progress, conceived in a broad-minded way that encompasses various aims that ear-
nest seekers of knowledge may have. Empirical facts and theoretical ideas recovered from 
the past can be incorporated into our store of knowledge, and they can also stimulate pre-
sent scientific inquiry. Thereby history can actually take us on to the roads-not-taken that 
constitute potential directions for new scientific developments. Even just critical scrutiny 
can help the progress of science. By exposing unrecognized biases and assumptions in pre-
sent science inherited from the past without fresh critical examination, historical work can 
encourage a helpful re-evaluation and re-orientation of present research—factually, theo-
retically, and methodologically.
More broadly, pluralist historiography can help us revise our very conception of pro-
gress, by raising important questions about what should count as progress. One lasting les-
son from Kuhn is pertinent: scientists working in different paradigms have different aims 
and different values. And part of the work here, recognized so clearly by historians of sci-
ence now, is highlighting ethical and social implications of scientific work, and recalling 
valuable connections between science and other human endeavors. I have largely neglected 
the broader social dimensions of science in this paper, but the relevance of history to these 
dimensions will be more easily accepted than the role of history in relation to the more 
strictly epistemological dimensions of science, which is what I have addressed here.
I think we have an exciting new prospect here: historical work can facilitate scientific 
progress itself, going clearly beyond the task of merely describing and explaining the pro-
gress that has happened without its influence. This is not such a strange idea after all, in 
relation to the role of history in other realms of human life. Actually what is strange is the 
notion that scientific progress can somehow be made without a proper and insightful under-
standing of the past.
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